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Recently, Russia has been struggling to reverse plunging birthrates by adopting a number 
of radical policies designed to encourage women to have more babies. The breakup of 
the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic and political instability prompted a decade-
long decline in fertility rates, which dropped from 1.72 children per woman in 1991 to 1.2 
children per woman in 2000. As a result, Russia lost nearly 6 million inhabitants. Relative 
stability and high oil prices in the decade that followed saw fertility rates settle at around 1.6 
children per woman in 2012 and 1.71 children per woman in 2013, which is still below the 
needed replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. This article focuses on the maternal 
capital subsidy for the birth of two or more children that took effect in 2007 and will run 
until 2016. It deals with two questions. The first question is, why has maternal capital fraud 
been so prevalent? The second question is, does maternal capital make a difference when 
it comes to increasing Russia’s birthrate? In exploring these questions, the article considers 
the future of maternal capital subsidy, specifically focusing on the social, economic, and 
political outcomes of the current Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula. The article concludes that the overly restrictive design of the maternal capital 
program provides a fertile ground for fraud and that this subsidy fails to address the many 
complex causes underlying Russia’s declining fertility rates, thus limiting its effectiveness. 
Mothers and their families want the maternal capital money here and now because they 
do not believe that the money will be available in the future (in part, such belief is justified 
by the turbulent history of the 1990s and several bank collapses). The other side of the coin 
is that the state does not trust its citizens to use maternal capital money in a responsible 
fashion and has thus prescribed very limited usages for these funds. This lack of trust on 
both sides creates fertile ground in which fraud and corruption flourish.
Keywords: maternal capital subsidy; maternal capital legislation; gender; fraud; fertility 
rates.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, russia has been struggling to reverse plunging birthrates by adopting 
a number of radical policies designed to encourage women to have more babies. 
Both Presidents Putin and Medvedev have acknowledged that declining birthrates 
combined with high death rates constitute one of the more serious problems facing 
the country and that radical measures are needed to address this situation.1 russia 
reached its historic population peak in 1991 at around 148.5 million. Its population 
fell to 142.9 million by 2014, with the united Nation’s most pessimistic projection 
suggesting a possible further decline to 120 million by 2025.2 the breakup of the 
soviet union and the ensuing economic and political instability prompted a decade-
long decline in fertility rates, which dropped from 1.72 children per woman in 1991 
to 1.2 children per woman in 2000.3 As a result, russia lost nearly 6 million inhabitants. 
relative stability and high oil prices in the decade that followed saw fertility rates settle 
at around 1.6 children per woman in 2012 and 1.71 children per woman in 2013, which 
is still below the needed replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.4 Consequently, 
1  Quoted in Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia’s Birth Rate, 32(2) Pop. dev. rev. 388 (2006). doi:10.1111/j.1728-
4457.2006.00126.x
2  demographic Policy in russia: From reflection to Actions 9 (uNdP 2008), available at <http://www.
undp.ru/download.php?749> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
3  throughout the 1970s, fertility rates varied between 1.92 and 2.03 children per woman. throughout 
the 1980s, fertility rates were between 1.87 and 2.23 children per woman. See Julie daVanzo & david 
Adamson, Russia’s Demographic ‘Crisis:’ How Real Is It?, rand Corporation (Jul. 1997), <http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP162.pdf> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
4  the russian Ministry of Labor states that in 2013 fertility rates rose to 1.71 children per woman. See 
1 июня в России отмечается международный день защиты детей [1 iyunya v Rossii otmechaetsya 
mezhdunarodnyi den’ zashchity detei [russia Celebrates International day of the Child on July 1]], 
Ministry of Labour and social welfare of the russian Federation (May 31, 2014), <http://www.
rosmintrud.ru/social/family/127> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015); see also demographic Policy in russia, 
supra n. 2; steven P. kramer, Baby Gap: How to Boost Birthrates and Avoid Demographic Decline, Foreign 
Affairs, May / Jun. 2012, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-05-01/baby-gap> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
ALExANDRA ORLOVA 85
in his 2006 annual state of the Nation Address, President Putin stated that, in order to 
resolve the demographic crisis facing russia, there was a need to increase birthrates, 
lower death rates, and implement an effective immigration policy.5 this article focuses 
on the maternal capital subsidy for the birth of two or more children that took effect 
in 2007 and that is designed to support and encourage women to give birth to more 
than one child. It begins with a brief historical review of population policies during 
the soviet regime and draws on some historical parallels between the role of the state 
in such policies during soviet times, in the early years after the collapse of the soviet 
union, and throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency. the article then aims to answer 
two questions. the first question is, why has maternal capital fraud been so prevalent, 
especially given the fact that it involves ordinary families trying to raise their children? 
the second question is, does maternal capital make a difference when it comes to 
increasing russia’s birthrate – the purpose for which it was introduced in the first 
place? In exploring these questions, the article considers the future of maternal capital 
subsidy, specifically focusing on the social, economic, and political outcomes of the 
current ukraine crisis and russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. the article 
concludes that the overly restrictive design of the maternal capital program provides 
a fertile ground for fraud and that this subsidy fails to address the many complex causes 
underlying russia’s declining fertility rates, thus limiting its effectiveness.
2. A Historical Overview of Population Policies
the problem of declining fertility rates, which is frequently discussed as 
a consequence of the russian economic transition in the 1990s, is actually not a new 
one. debates about fertility rates and population policies were prominent features 
in the soviet era. the soviet state claimed to provide ‘for all citizens’ material needs 
through the provision of employment, housing, education, and health care . . . 
[so] the state viewed women as responsible for both productive and reproductive 
labor for the good of society.’6 Although abortions were legalized in 1920, they 
were subsequently prohibited in 1936.7 In that same year a program that provided 
some financial relief to large families took effect. this program of support provided 
annual allowances for seventh and subsequent children until their fifth birthday, 
irrespective of a family’s financial circumstances. In 1944, due to concerns about the 
enormous population losses in world war II, this program of support was extended to 
5  Quoted in Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia’s Birth Rate, supra n. 1.
6  Michele rivkin-Fish, Pronatalism, Gender Politics, and the Renewal of Family Support in Russia: Toward 
a Feminist Anthropology of ‘Maternity Capital,‘ 69(3) slavic rev. 706 (2010).
7  susan g. solomon, The Demographic Argument in Soviet Debates over the Legalization of Abortion in 
the 1920s, 33(1) Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique (1992), available at <http://www.persee.fr/
articleAsPdF/cmr_0008-0160_1992_num_33_1_2306/article_cmr_0008-0160_1992_num_33_1_2306.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015). doi:10.3406/cmr.1992.2306
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cover third and subsequent children. under the scope of this program, a lump-sum 
payment was provided for the birth of third and subsequent children. Furthermore, 
upon the birth of the fourth and subsequent children, the mother was entitled to 
receive monthly payments until the children reached the age of five.8
An interesting feature of this program involved single mothers. these mothers 
received additional monthly payments for their first three children until they reached 
the age of twelve (a feature that was not available for married mothers).9 It is notable 
that the soviet state, despite its declared preference for family values, has always 
extended (at least in theory) special protections to single mothers. the focus of the 
state was directly on the child, rather than on the family per se. Various state policies, 
such as subsidized daycares for single mothers and slightly higher child benefit 
payments, made it clear that ‘childbearing was welcomed even when parents’ living 
arrangements fell far short of the [ideal family] model.’10
As a matter of fact, motherhood was frequently discussed as a woman’s duty to 
the state. Bearing children was considered a responsibility of citizenship, not a private 
choice.11 thus, the relationship that was continually emphasized was that of the state 
as a provider and the mother as a receiver of various economic and social benefits. 
Fathers were largely left out of this equation. the role of the father in child-rearing was 
very rarely discussed. Although fathers were ‘assigned the symbolic role of the family’s 
financial provider,’ the reality of overall low salaries and women’s active participation 
in the workforce, excluded fathers from the mother-state relationship.12
despite the re-legalization of abortion in 1955, the state’s emphasis on 
childbearing continued unabated. doctors were instructed to strongly discourage 
women from terminating pregnancies and contraceptives were in short supply 
until the fall of the soviet union.13 regardless of various pronatalist state measures, 
it started to become apparent in the late 1960s that birthrates were declining. It was 
8  david M. heer & Judith g. Bryden, Family Allowances and Population Policy in the U.S.S.R., 28(4) J. Marr. 
Fam. 515 (1966).
9  Id.
10  Nicholas B. Barkalov, Changes in the Quantum of Russian Fertility During the 1980s and Early 1990s, 
31(3) Pop. dev. rev. 551 (2005). doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2005.00084.x
In part this state attitude could be explained by the huge losses to the male population during the 
revolution and the two world wars. some sources indicate that there were 20 million more women 
of reproductive age than men. See Курганов И.А. Женщины и коммунизм [kurganov I.A. Zhenshchiny 
i kommunism [Ivan A. kurganov, womens and Communism]] 139–205 (1968).
11  olga Issoupova, From Duty to Pleasure: Motherhood in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, in gender, state 
and society in soviet and Post-soviet russia 30, 33 (sarah Ashwin, ed.) (routledge 2000), available 
at <http://www.busin.biz/library/soviet%20union/women%20in%20the%20ussr/sarah%20
Ashwin%20-%20gender,%20state%20and%20society%20in%20soviet%20and%20Post-soviet%20
russia.pdf> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
12  Id. at 38.
13  Mie Nakachi, N.S. Khrushchev and the 1944 Soviet Family Law: Politics, Reproduction, Language, 20(1) E. 
Eur. Pol. soc. (2006). doi: 10.1177/0888325405284313
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also quite clear that there was a wide disparity between population growth rates 
in the slavic-populated and Muslim-populated regions of the soviet union, with 
the slavic-populated areas experiencing more significant declines.14 In part, this 
decline in fertility rates was due to the fact that child allowance payments did not 
constitute a substantial amount that would actually relieve some of the significant 
costs associated with raising children. the payments were approximately 4.4% of the 
average wage.15 Although women were provided with subsidized daycares, generous 
sick leaves, paid vacations, and numerous other ‘in-kind’ benefits, most continued 
to live in substandard housing with no possibility of improving their daily living 
conditions. thus, despite the existence of benefits, women were left to do ‘double 
duty’ of full-time employment and child-rearing.16
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as fertility rates continued their downward 
trend (especially in the European part of the soviet union), public debates centered 
on emphasizing women’s ‘mission’ and obligation to society. small families were 
portrayed as a ‘deviant and dangerous phenomenon.’17 In 1981, the soviet leadership 
clearly endorsed the regional approach to demographic policy. It introduced lump-
sum payments for first, second, and third births, extended child allowance programs 
for second and higher order births (previously only available after the birth of a third 
child), and extended partially paid maternity leave to all women.18 the implementation 
of these measures was to be introduced gradually, ‘step by step in different regions of 
the country.’19 slavic regions, such as siberia and the Far East, were to be the primary 
beneficiaries of these measures. Apart from the question of cost of introducing these 
changes, political considerations also played a role, as Central Asian minorities were 
becoming more nationally assertive and were starting to use their rapid population 
growth as leverage in negotiating with central soviet leadership.20
the problem of declining fertility rates was exacerbated in the 1990s as the soviet 
union collapsed. the entire social security net that was taken for granted for several 
generations disintegrated. Employment security was no longer guaranteed and 
deregulated market prices unleashed hyperinflation. In 1992 prices rose over 2,500% for 
the year.21 these rapid changes associated with economic restructuring resulted in
14  Cynthia weber & Ann goodman, The Demographic Policy Debate in the USSR, 7(2) Pop. dev. rev. 281 
(1981).
15  heer & Bryden, supra n. 8, at 516.
16  helen desfosses, Pro-Natalism in Soviet Law and Propaganda, in soviet Population Policy: Conflicts 
and Constraints 95 (helen desfosses, ed.) (Pergamon Press 1981).
17  rivkin-Fish, supra n. 6, at 708.
18  desfosses, supra n. 16.
19  weber & goodman, supra n. 14, at 279.
20  Id. at 287.
21  Barkalov, supra n. 10, at 552.
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a drop in per capita income in real terms to 40 percent of its 1991 equivalent; 
expanded poverty (the main trade union body concluded that 80 percent of 
the population had fallen below the poverty line); great income inequality; 
the loss of lifetime savings by most people; and quite importantly, the 
disappearance of general as well as child support benefits.22
given these major political, social, and economic changes, the discourses that 
were prevalent throughout the 1980s that labelled women who chose to have only 
one child as ‘selfish’ virtually ceased during the 1990s. the economic crisis that russia 
was facing presented an understandable barrier to larger families, as most people 
were thinking about their daily survival.23 Fertility rates dropped sharply. the most 
significant drop was in the probability of having a second child, which led to the one-
child family becoming the most prevalent.24 Furthermore, a realization was setting 
in that state support could no longer be guaranteed or relied upon. Maternity was 
being reconceptualized as no longer a state function, but rather a private experience, 
where the full financial responsibility would also fall on the family, instead of being 
shared with the state. throughout the 1990s, the state undertook mainly symbolic 
projects that acknowledged the importance of motherhood, such as creating 
a National Mother’s day in 1999.25
As the russian economic situation started to improve in the early 2000s and 
fertility rates continued their downward trend, the soviet-era idea of state economic 
investment into motherhood started to gain momentum once more. Even in his first 
public address to the nation in 2000, Putin stated that russia’s survival as a nation 
was threatened by the country’s decreasing population.26 hence, not surprisingly, 
the concept of maternal capital aligned with the whole idea of reasserting state 
control over various spheres of private life, which became the hallmark of Putin’s 
presidency.
3. How Maternal Capital Works
the idea of maternal capital was first introduced by President Putin in his 2006 
state of the Nation Address.27 In a marked difference from past speeches, this address 
22  Barkalov, supra n. 10, at 552.
23  rivkin-Fish, supra n. 6, at 710.
24  Barkalov, supra n. 10, at 553.
25  Issoupova, supra n. 11, at 40.
26  Путин В. Какую Россию мы строим // Российская газета. 2000. 11 июля. № 133 [Putin V. Kakuyu 
Rossiyu my stroim // Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2000. 11 iyulya. No. 133 [Vladimir Putin, What Kind of Russia 
Are We Building, 2000(133) russian gazette]].
27  Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia’s Birth Rate, supra n. 1, at 388.
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gave a great deal of detail in terms of how maternal capital would function. Putin 
stated that ‘[i]t must provide [women who give birth to more than one child] with, 
so to speak, a start-up base, motherhood capital that would raise [their] social status 
and help solve future problems.’28 Following President Putin’s speech, in 2007, the 
government introduced a maternal capital subsidy, indexed to inflation,29 for the 
birth of two or more children.30 the subsidy is scheduled to run from January 1, 2007, 
to december 31, 2016.31 Initially, maternal capital payments were approximately 
$9,232 (or 250,000 rubles) and, in 2014, they reached $12,477 (or 429,408 rubles).32 
the russian Federal Pension Fund administers the federal maternal capital payments 
and issues maternal capital certificates to the qualified applicants.33 According to the 
Federal Pension Fund statistics, it has issued approximately 3.4 million maternal capital 
certificates since this program came into effect.34 over 97% of recipients of maternal 
capital certificates have used them in connection with real estate transactions.35
28  Valeria korchagina & oksana yablokova, Putin Offers Mothers Cash for More Babies, the Moscow times 
(May 11, 2006), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-offers-mothers-cash-for-
more-babies/205109.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
29  the purchasing power of maternal capital has actually been declining over the years, as the annual rates 
of increases (especially in the past couple of years) have been below inflation rates and will amount 
only to 4.5% in 2016 and 4.3% in 2017, while the current inflation rate is 8% and is expected to rise. See 
Материнский капитал в 2015 году [Materinskii kapital v 2015 godu [Maternal Capital in 2015]], <http://
materinskij-kapital.ru/razmer-materinskogo-kapitala/v-2015-godu> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
30  See Федеральный закон от 29 декабря 2006 г. № 256-ФЗ «О дополнительных мерах государст-
венной поддержки семей, имеющих детей» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 29 dekyabrya 2006 g. No. 256-FZ 
‘O dopolnitel’nykh merakh gosudarstvennoi podderzhki semei, imeyushchikh detei’ [Federal Law No. 256-
FZ of december 29, 2006, ‘on Additional government support Measures of Families with Children’]] 
[hereinafter Federal Law No. 256-FZ]. the details of how to apply for maternal capital were outlined in 
the decree of the government of the russian Federation No. 873 of december 30, 2006. In addition to 
the federal maternal capital program, similar programs started to emerge in various russian regions 
beginning in 2011. See Пособия на ребенка – регионы [Posobiya na rebenka – regiony [Child support 
in regions]], <http://posobie-na-rebenka.ru/regionyi/> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
31  See Портал о материнском капитале [Portal o materinskom kapitale [Maternal Capital Portal]], <http://
www.matkap.ru> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
32  Материнский капитал в 2014 году – новости и изменения [Materinskii kapital – novosti i izmeneniya 
v 2014 godu [Maternal Capital – News and Changes in 2014]], <http://www.matkap.ru/news.php> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
33  Бекренева Т. Материнский капитал – повод для мошенничества // Жилищное право. 2012. № 4 
[Bekreneva t. Materinskii capital – povod dlya moshennichestva // Zhilishchnoe pravo. 2012. No. 4 
[tatyana Bekreneva, Maternal Capital – Reason for Fraud, 2012(4) housing Law]], available at <http://
www.top-personal.ru/estatelawissue.html?333> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
34  See Лучше чтобы материнского капитала не было? [Luchshe chtoby materinskogo kapitala ne 
bylo? [It Would Be Better If Maternal Capital Never Existed?]], <http://www.matkap.ru/otvet-na-kritiku.
php> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
35  Баязитова А., Маетная Е. Материнский капитал станет полностью жилищным [Bayazitova A., 
Maetnaya E. Materinskii kapital stanet polnost’u zhilishchnym [Alexandra Bayazitova & Elizaveta 
Maetnaya, Maternal Capital Will Become Fully Lodging-Related]], Izvestiya (Feb. 10, 2014), <http://
izvestia.ru/news/565317> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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despite the fact that the title of the law suggests that maternal capital 
supports ‘families’ (‘on Additional government support Measures of Families with 
Children’), the money is primarily directed towards women who are citizens of the 
russian Federation and who either gave birth to or adopted a second (or third or 
subsequent) child between 2007 and 2016.36 so, a woman who already has one child 
and gives birth to (or adopts) a second child between 2007 and 2016 is entitled to 
receive maternal capital subsidy. If a woman already has two children and gives 
birth to (or adopts) a third child between 2007 and 2016, she is likewise entitled to 
receive this subsidy. If a woman gives birth to more than one child between 2007 
and 2016, she is entitled to claim maternal capital subsidy only once. Men or children 
can receive maternal capital certificates in a very limited range of circumstances, 
mostly in cases when the mother has died, her parental rights were taken away, 
or she committed a criminal offence against her children (such as murder, assault, 
failure to provide necessities of life, etc.) and is facing prison time.37 the Constitutional 
Court of the russian Federation clearly indicated that a father’s right to maternal 
capital is residual and can be realized only when the mother is unable to receive the 
payments.38 In terms of the mother’s right to receive maternal capital, the russian 
courts have, for the most part, considered a fact of birth of a second or a third child 
as an event upon which the entitlement to receive maternal capital emerges, despite 
the absence of documents, such as birth certificates. For instance, mothers who had 
lost their children in the first week of life and who did not possess birth certificates 
for them presented the Federal Pension Fund with a medical certificate indicating 
that the birth took place and were granted maternal capital certificates.39 Mothers 
of premature babies that were born just before January 1, 2007, when the law came 
into effect, were also granted maternal capital certificates.40
36  See Art. 3 of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
37  See Arts. 3(1)(3) and 3(3) of the Federal Law No. 256; see also decision of the supreme Court of the 
russian Federation of January 27, 2012. Case No. 81-V11-11 (in regards to a mother committing 
a crime against her children).
38  See decision of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 1085-o-o of october 13, 
2009. the Constitutional Court considered a case of a father, whose first wife passed away and left 
him with a child. the father later had a second child with his second wife. however, he was denied 
maternal capital. however, if a woman has two children from different fathers, she is entitled to 
receive maternal capital.
39  See decisions of the russian supreme Court of the russian Federation of June 18, 2010. Case 
No. 51-V10-12; of November 26, 2009. Case No. 29-V09-6; of June 17, 2010. Case No. 51-V10-9; however, 
see decision of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 542-o of April 23, 2013 (denying 
maternal capital due to the absence of a birth certificate for a woman whose baby died in the first week 
of life in 1994 (prior to amendments dealing with birth certificates that took place in 1997 (see Federal 
Law No. 143-FZ of November 15, 1997))). Mothers of stillborn children were denied maternal capital 
(see decision of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 1439-o-o of November 9, 
2010). Finally, Federal Law No. 241-FZ of July 28, 2010, resolved the issue of children who died in the 
first week of life and granted the right to maternal capital to their mothers.
40  See decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation of June 3, 2011. Case No. 4-V11-15.
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the key design feature of the federal maternal capital subsidy is that it is not 
a direct cash payout (i.e. it is not paid out when the child is born)41 and the funds can 
be used only for certain things in three specific areas.42 First, maternal capital can 
be directed towards ‘improvement of a family’s living conditions;’ second, it can be 
used for children’s educational needs; and, finally, it can be invested in the mother’s 
future pension.43 In most cases, maternal capital funds can be used only when the 
second or subsequent child has reached the age of three.44 hence, even though the 
maternal capital law came into effect in 2007, the first payments did not start until 
2010. Furthermore, because the maternal capital is a one-time support measure, 
once the mother has qualified for the funds after the birth of her second child (for 
a mother with one child having her second), she cannot qualify for it again if she has 
more children. Maternal capital funds, however, can be directed toward the welfare 
of all members of the family, not just the child whose birth entitled the mother to 
the funds (i.e. the funds may be used to pay for the education of a first child or to 
buy an apartment for the family).45
An interesting feature of the maternal capital law is the provision that maternal 
capital certificates and hence maternal capital can be received by citizens of the 
russian Federation ‘irrespective of their place of residence.’46 technically, this entitles 
russian women living abroad to receive a maternal capital subsidy, as long as they 
still hold russian citizenship and their second (or subsequent) child is a russian 
citizen. the child’s place of birth as well as the citizenship of the father are irrelevant.47 
Initially, when russian embassies and consulates started to face questions regarding 
receipt of maternal capital subsidy, the confusion was around the issue of whether 
the family should still be able to demonstrate an official place of residence 
(address) in russia. some applicants were given the wrong information that if they 
had left russia for a permanent residence abroad, they would no longer qualify for 
a maternal capital subsidy.48 however, a clarification was issued in a 2008 government 
41  the maternal capital program is designed so that the maternal capital subsidy is never paid directly 
to a mother who applies for it. It is instead transferred to either a bank, to cover a mortgage payment, 
or deposited into a pension fund, or paid out to a daycare to cover childcare expenses.
42  Bekreneva, supra n. 33.
43  See Art. 7(3)(3) of the of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
44  See Art. 3(7) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
45  Материнский капитал: вопросы и ответы [Materinskii kapital: voprosy i otvety [Maternal Capital: 
Questions and Answers]], Rossiiskaya gazeta (Jul. 25, 2007), <http://www.rg.ru/2011/07/25/matkapital-
baza-yurist.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
46  see Art. 3(1) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
47  see Art. 3(1)(3) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
48  Асадова Н., Погонина Л., Соловьев В., Качуровская А. Не те дети [Asadova N., Pogonina L., solovyov V., 
kachurovskaya A. Ne te deti [Nargiz Asadova et al., Inappropriate Children]], Kommersant (Apr. 9, 2007), 
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/757037> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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decree that entitled even those women who had left russia to take up permanent 
residence abroad to receive maternal capital subsidy.49 the limitation, of course, 
is that the maternal capital subsidy must only be used within the territory of the 
russian Federation.50 this territorial restriction on usage has encouraged applicants 
to monetize maternal capital in various ways, which will be discussed below. the 
question that needs to be considered is, why has the law on maternal capital not 
been restricted in its application to citizens of the russian Federation actually living 
in russia, since its purpose is to improve the demographic situation within russia 
rather than in other jurisdictions? some have suggested that the purpose behind 
this particular legislative provision is to encourage families to apply for russian 
citizenship and thus expand russia’s geopolitical influence through its diasporas.51
the maternal capital law has undergone a number of amendments. some of the 
most significant ones include the ability to use maternal capital before the second or 
subsequent child’s third birthday for the limited purpose of paying off a mortgage 
or other type of loan connected to the purchase of real estate. this amendment 
came into effect on January 1, 2011.52 despite maternal capital not being a direct 
cash payout, a special anti-financial crisis measure was adopted by the federal 
government allowing one-time cash payouts of $350.00 (12,000 rubles) to each 
maternal capital applicant between May 2009 and May 2011.53 In November 2011, 
49  See decree of the government of the russian Federation No. 709 of september 22, 2008.
50  See Art. 7 of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
51  Asadova et al., supra n. 48.
52  see Art. 7(6)(1) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ; see also Горовцова М. Материнский капитал: какие 
изменения можно ожидать в будущем [gorovtsova M. Materinskii kapital: kakie izmeneniya mozhno 
ozhidat’ v budushchem [Margarita gorovtsova, Maternal Capital: What Changes Could We Expect in the 
Future]], garant (sep. 13., 2013), <http://www.garant.ru/article/493842/> (accessed Jul. 26, 2014).
53  See Федеральный закон от 28 апреля 2009 г. № 72-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в отдельные 
законодательные акты Российской Федерации в целях повышения уровня материального 
обеспечения отдельных категорий граждан» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 28 aprelya 2009 g. No. 72-FZ 
‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v tselyakh povysheniya urovnya 
material’nogo obespecheniya otdel’nykh kategorii grazhdan’ [Federal Law No. 72-FZ of April 28, 2009, 
‘on Amendments to Certain Laws of the russian Federation with the Aim of Increasing Material 
welfare of Certain Categories of Citizens’]] and Федеральный закон от 28 июля 2010 г. № 241-ФЗ 
«О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации и о порядке 
предоставления единовременной выплаты за счет средств материнского (семейного) капитала» 
[Federal’nyi zakon ot 28 iyulya 2010 g. No. 241-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii i o poryadke predostavleniya edinovremennoi vyplaty za schet sredstv materinskogo 
(semeinogo) kapitala’ [Federal Law No. 241-FZ of July 28, 2010, ‘on Amendments to Certain Laws of 
the russian Federation regarding the one time Cash Payouts from Maternal (Family) Capital’]]; see 
also Кашина M.A., Юкина И.И. Российская демографическая политика: опыт гендерного анализа // 
Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии. 2009. № 12. С. 114 [kashina M.A., yukina I.I. 
Rossiiskaya demograficheskaya politika: opyt gendernogo analiza // Zhurnal sotsiologii i sotsial’noi 
antropologii. 2009. No. 12. s. 114 [Marina A. kashina & Irina I. yukina, The Russian Population Policy: 
An Attempt at Gender Analysis, 2009(12) Journal of sociology and social Anthropology 114]], available 
at <http://old.jourssa.ru/2009/1/08_kachina.pdf> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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it became possible to use maternal capital to pay for children’s daycare costs.54 the 
reason this amendment was adopted was to entice some of the maternal capital 
recipients to use it for education. the majority of the recipients were very reluctant 
to use maternal capital money for higher education and wanted to use the money 
‘here and now.’ Parents indicated their uncertainty about future educational reforms 
and the availability of the money in the future. they were also hoping that their 
children would benefit from free education, as they had themselves.55 despite the 
ability to use maternal capital to pay for daycare expenses, the payment of such 
expenses is only possible once the child turns three years old. It also takes the 
Federal Pension Fund about one month to make a decision about the applicant’s 
entitlement to maternal capital and a further two months to release the funds, which 
may cause a problem for some institutions already reluctant to accept maternal 
capital certificates.56 Furthermore, it is very difficult to secure a subsidized daycare 
space in russia due to a shortage of such spaces – a legacy of the 1990s when 
most daycares closed and their buildings were used to open businesses. Private 
54  See Постановление РФ от 14 ноября 2011 г. № 931 «О внесении изменений в Правила направления 
средств (части средств) материнского (семейного) капитала на получение образования 
ребенком (детьми) и осуществление иных связанных с получением образования ребенком 
(детьми) расходов» [Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF ot 14 noyabrya 2011 g. No. 931 ‘O vnesenii izmenenii 
v Pravila napravleniya sredstv (chasti sredstv) materinskogo (semeinogo) kapitala na poluchenie 
obrazovaniya rebenkom (det’mi) i osushchestvlenie inykh svyazannykh s polucheniem obrazovaniya 
rebenkom (det’mi) raskhodov’ [decree of the government of the russian Federation No. 931 of 
November 14, 2011, ‘on Amendments to the rules dealing with Maternal Capital Being directed to 
Education of the Child and other Educational Expenses’]]. Although not directly related to maternal 
capital, but aiming to achieve a similar aim of improving the birthrate, a federal law was passed in 
2011 stating that families who give birth to a third child will be entitled to 0.15 hectares of land free of 
charge in order to build houses for their families, with each region in russia deciding on the location 
of such ‘free land.’ In the majority of cases, this land is not made available in the cities, where real 
estate is at a premium, but rather requires a move to the country, in some cases quite far away from 
the city, making it an unrealistic prospect for many families. Furthermore, even though the land is 
free, the cost of building a house still falls on the family. See Федеральный закон от 14 июня 2011 г. 
№ 138-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в статью 16 Федерального закона «О содействии развитию 
жилищного строительства» и Земельный кодекс Российской Федерации» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 14 
iyunya 2011 g. No. 138-FZ  ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v stat’yu 16 Federal’nogo zakona “O sodeistvii razvitiyu 
zhilishchnogo stroitel’stva” i Zemel’nyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Federal Law No. 138-FZ of June 14, 
2011, ‘on Amendments to Article 16 of the Federal Law “on Assistance in development of housing 
Construction” and to the Land Code of the russian Federation’]].
55  Бороздина E.A., Здравомыслова Е.А., Темкина А.А. Как распорядиться «материнским капиталом» 
или граждане в семейной политике // Социологические исследования. 2012. № 12. С. 112 
[Borozdina E.A., Zdravomyslova E.A., temkina A.A. Kak rasporyadit’sya ‘materinskim kapitalom’ 
ili grazhdane v semeinoi politike // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya. 2012. No. 7. s. 112 [Ekaterina A. 
Borozdina et al., How to Use the ‘Maternal Kapital’ or Citizens in the Family Policy, 2012(7) sociological 
research 112]], available at <http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/2012/11/12/1251376529/Borozdina.pdf> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
56  Id.; see also Бугрова О., Бочкова Л. Все что нужно, чтобы получить и использовать материнский 
капитал [Bugrova o., Bochkova L. Vse chto nuzhno, chtoby poluchit' i ispolzovat' materinskii kapital [olga 
Bugrova & Lidiya Bochkova, Everything You Need to Receive and Use the Maternal Capital]], Glavbukh 
(Feb. 27, 2009), <http://www.glavbukh.ru/art/15881> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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daycares, on the other hand, cost a lot, so it is a struggle for an average family 
with even one child to afford it.57 thus, the use of maternal capital for educational 
purposes is rather limited. given the fact that most maternal capital recipients use 
it to ‘improve their living conditions,’ and court practice is inconsistent in terms of 
interpreting what transactions amount to such an improvement,58 it is not surprising 
that the most fraudulent uses of maternal capital relate to real estate.59 In certain 
regions of russia, however, particularly in the south, frauds involving ‘fake children’ 
have been detected. this type of fraud involves obtaining false documents that 
indicate the birth of a child and often involves the collusion of ‘mothers,’ oBgyNs, 
and pediatricians.60 For the most part, however, families want to ‘monetize’ maternal 
capital and be able to spend the money on what they truly need, instead of being 
limited by the strictly prescribed usages for such capital that have been outlined 
by the state.61
4. Common Frauds Perpetrated with Maternal Capital
Although estimates of the extent of maternal capital fraud vary, they all agree that 
it is very widespread.62 some of the more typical schemes for monetizing maternal 
capital through real estate transactions include: 1) obtaining mortgages on property 
belonging to a criminal organization; 2) buying property from relatives; 3) buying 
property for an inflated price; and 4) buying non-existent property that is resold 
immediately.
the first scheme involves the holder of the maternal capital certificate (usually 
the mother) entering into a fake purchase agreement for a property that is controlled 
57  See Maternal Capital Portal, supra n. 31.
58  Фиошин А.В. Материнский (семейный) капитал: некоторые особенности судебной практики // 
Российская юстиция. 2013. № 4. С. 60, 62 [Fioshin A.V. Materinskii (semeinyi) kapital: nekotorye 
osobennosti sudebnoi praktiki // Rossiiskaya yustitsiya. 2013. No. 4. s. 60, 62 [Alexander V. Fioshin, 
Maternal (Family) Capital: Some Peculiarities of Jurisprudence, 2013(4) russian Justice 60, 62]], available 
at <http://www.center-bereg.ru/c120.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
59  since the commencement of the maternal capital program, only 0.4% of participants used it towards 
the mother’s pension. the reason for such low usage is a lack of trust that the pension fund will actually 
make any money in the future. See gorovtsova, supra n. 52.
60  one of the reasons this type of fraud is particularly widespread in the south of russia is due to a high 
number of home births in the region, as compared with the rest of russia. See Мун О. Махинации 
с материнским капиталом // Жилищное право. 2013. № 6 [Mun o. Makhinatsii s materinskim 
kapitalom // Zhilishchnoe pravo. 2013. No. 6 [oksana Mun, Frauds with Maternal Capital, 2013(6) housing 
Law]], available at <http://www.top-personal.ru/estatelawissue.html?466> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
61  Borozdina et al., supra n. 55.
62  Estimates about fraudulent usages of maternal capital vary between 20 and 70%, depending on the 
region. See «Обналичка» маткапитала аукнется в будущем [‘Obnalichka’ matkapitala auknetsya 
v budushchem [Cashing of the Maternal Capital Will Backfire in the Future]], <http://www.bkn.ru/
Articles/3014-obnalichka_matkapitala_auknietsia_v_budushchiem.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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by a criminal organization. then, a request for a mortgage (usually in the amount 
of the maternal capital) is made either to a ‘friendly’ bank or a small loan agency. 
the Pension Fund then directs the maternal capital to the bank or loan agency to 
pay the mortgage, which is subsequently transferred to the seller (i.e. the criminal 
organization).63 the criminal organization, in turn, shares the money with the mother, 
after taking a significant amount for its ‘services.’64 this type of a scheme has become 
quite popular in the wake of the 2011 amendment that no longer requires the family 
to wait until the child turns three years old if the maternal capital is to be used 
towards a mortgage payment.65 such schemes are particularly dangerous, because 
a criminal organization can refuse to share the maternal capital funds with the 
mother66 and, if fraud is discovered, the mother not only would have to repay such 
monies to the Pension Fund67 but also would face criminal charges under Art. 159 
(‘Fraud’) of the russian Criminal Code.68 hence, mothers who have been defrauded 
in this way often do not come forward to report these crimes.69
the second scheme entails purchasing real estate from relatives (preferably 
with a different last name from the holder of the maternal capital certificate). these 
63  Bekreneva, supra n. 33.
64  See Материнский капитал: обналичивание незаконно [Materinskii capital: obnalichivanie nezakonno 
[Maternal Capital: Cashing Is Illegal]], <http://kapitalm.ru/moshennichestvo/materinskij-kapital-
obnalichivanie-nezakonno> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
65  See Art. 7(6)(1) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
66  Андреев А. Первое дело о хищениях маткапитала ушло в суд [Andreev A. Pervoe delo o khishcheniyakh 
matkapitala ushlo v sud [Andrey Andreev, The First Case of Theft of Maternal Capital Was Sent to Court]], 
Rossiiskaya gazeta (Aug. 16, 2013).
67  See decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation of september 24, 2013. Case No. 82-kg13-4 
(stating that when a real estate transaction is null and void due to fraud, maternal capital funds have 
to be repaid to the Pension Fund); see also decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation 
of November 23, 2012. Case No. 88-kg12-2 (stating that the courts should consider the substance of 
the transaction in determining whether the ‘living conditions were improved’).
68  See Гуляев Е. В Кудымкаре раскрыто мошенничество с материнским капиталом [gulyaev E. 
V Kudymkare raskryto moshennichestvo s materinskim kapitalom [Evgeny gulyaev, Fraud with Maternal 
Capital Uncovered in Kudymkar]], Vesti (Feb. 5, 2013), <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1024163> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015); Тольяттинку и риэлтора будут судить за мошенничество с материнским 
капиталом [Tol’yattinku i rieltora budut sudit’ za moshennichestvo s materinskim kapitalom [A Resident 
of Tolyatti and a Realtor Will Be Prosecuted for Fraud with Maternal Capital]], tLtnews.ru (Aug. 17, 2013), 
<http://www.tltnews.ru/tlt_news/16/430893/> (accessed Jul. 27, 20145); Женщину будут судить 
за мошенничество с материнским капиталом [Zhenshchinu budut sudit’ za moshennichestvo 
s materinskim kapitalom [A Woman Will Be Prosecuted for Fraud with Maternal Capital]], Mk.ru (Aug. 19, 
2013), <http://brl.mk.ru/news/2013/08/19/901508-zhenschinu-budut-sudit-za-moshennichestvo-s-
materinskim-kapitalom.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
69  Рубникович O., Ильина Н., Бутрин Д., Антонов К. Материнский капитал выводили по всей стране 
[rubnikovich o., Iliina N., Butrin d., Antonov k. Materinskii kapital vyvodili po vsei strane [oleg 
rubnikovich et al., Maternal Capital Was Cached All Over the Country]], Kommersant (Nov. 20, 2013), 
<http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2347986> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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relatives continue to live in the apartment or the house and return the maternal 
capital money they receive from the Pension Fund to the mother.70
the third scheme consists of buying a property that is either not fit for habitation 
or is located in a very remote rural area where real estate prices are low. the property is 
supposedly sold for the amount of maternal capital received, when in reality it is worth 
much less. once the seller of the property receives the money, he / she will return the 
money to the buyer, minus the real purchase price. In reality, the buyer has no interest 
in actually living on the property and hence the property can be used multiple times 
by many different individuals wanting to monetize their maternal capital.71
the fourth scheme involves ‘purchasing’ a non-existent property that is resold 
right away. this scheme is popular with the holders of maternal capital certificates 
who already own real estate and are not looking to buy. hence, the fake property is 
frequently ‘bought’ in an area where prices are easily covered by the maternal capital. 
often such property is bought through a real estate agency that participates in this 
fraud and later shares the money with the holders of maternal capital certificates 
after subtracting fees for their services.72
5. Why Is Fraud So Prevalent?
given the numerous fraudulent schemes associated with maternal capital and the 
related corruption surrounding it, the obvious question that needs to be considered 
is, why is maternal capital fraud so prevalent, especially given the fact that it involves 
ordinary families trying to raise their children and is often perpetrated by young 
mothers? one of the primary reasons for why this particular type of fraud is so 
widespread is the very limited number of uses prescribed by the state for maternal 
capital. Most families with children need the money right away to satisfy their daily 
needs.73 this is especially true when it comes to single mothers with multiple children 
or families with sick or disabled children.74 thus, the limited ways that maternal 
capital can be used is what breeds most fraud and corruption surrounding it. 
70  Гагаева K., Тычкин К. Мошеннические схемы: от «обналички» маткапитала до рейдерства // Жилищ- 
ное право. 2012. № 9 [gagaeva k., tychkin k. Moshennicheskie shemy: ot ‘obnalichki’ matkapitala 
do reiderstva // Zhilishchnoe pravo. 2012. No. 9 [kseniya gagaeva & konstantin tychkin, Fraudulent 
Schemes: From Maternal Capital Cashing to Raiding, 2012(9) housing Law]], available at <http://
lexandbusiness.ru/view-article.php?id=1124> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
71  Bekreneva, supra n. 33.
72  Mun, supra n. 60.
73  Borozdina et al., supra n. 55.
74  Заем под материнский капитал – средства обналичить не получится! [Zaem pod materinskii 
kapital – sredstva obnalichit’ ne poluchitsya! [Loan under the Maternal Capital – Cashing is Impossible!]], 
Pravo sotsial’nogo obespecheniya (Jan. 10, 2014), <http://system-social.ru/semj/materinskij_kapital/
zaem.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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to most families, it makes little sense that maternal capital cannot be used to treat 
a sick or a disabled child,75 to buy a car (especially in large cities), or to conduct 
essential repairs on a house or an apartment.76
one of the purposes designated by the state for maternal capital is to ‘improve living 
conditions,’ but this phrase has received a very narrow and inconsistent interpretation 
by the courts.77 Allowing maternal capital to be used to conduct necessary repairs 
would dramatically improve living conditions for many young russian families who 
often live in cramped and dilapidated apartments together with their elderly parents. 
similarly, maternal capital cannot be used to purchase land on which the house will 
be built at some point in the future.78 thus, a family with children frequently cannot 
use maternal capital for the purposes that would truly improve their lives. Instead, 
they either do not take advantage of the program or are driven to commit fraud by 
monetizing the maternal capital to which they are entitled.
Even if a family decides to ‘improve their living conditions’ through a purchase 
of better housing, in most cases the amount of maternal capital is not enough to 
make a substantive difference.79 For example, at the end of 2006, it was only possible 
to purchase two square meters of property in Moscow using maternal capital. since 
then, the real estate prices have risen even further in most large cities in russia.80 
Furthermore, in a hot real estate market with competing bids, sellers frequently do 
not want to wait for up to two months for the Pension Fund to transfer the maternal 
capital funds. hence, buyers relying on such funds are placed at a disadvantage.81
some families have attempted to use maternal capital to pay off a mortgage. 
In 2011, it became possible to apply to the Pension Fund right after the birth of 
75  several bills which would allow maternal capital to be used to treat sick or disabled children were voted 
down in the state duma due to the fact that healthcare is free in the russian Federation. however, 
poor conditions and lack of resources at many state hospitals make it impossible for those institutions 
to address the needs of seriously ill patients, driving individuals into private healthcare facilities. See 
Maternal Capital – News and Changes in 2014, supra n. 32.
76  thus, a family can buy a small house in a remote village, which they do not need, but cannot conduct 
quality repairs on their current home. See Материнский капитал: вопросы и ответы, supra note 45.
77  Fioshin, supra n. 58, at 60–62.
78  Maternal Capital: Questions and Answers, supra n. 45.
79  rivkin-Fish, supra n. 6, at 717.
80  Севрюков Н. Россия планирует осуществить первый демографический взрыв [sevryukov N. Rossiya 
planiruet osushchestvit’ pervyi demograficheskii vzryv [Nikolay sevryukov, Russia Plans to Carry Out the 
First Population Explosion]], VIPErsoN (Jan. 18, 2007), <http://viperson.ru/articles/nikolay-sevryukov-
rossiya-planiruet-osuschestvit-pervyy-demograficheskiy-vzryv> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
81  Баталова А. Не детская доля. На Урале участились случаи незаконных сделок с материнским 
капиталом [Batalova A. Ne detskaya dolya. Na Urale uchastilis’ sluchai nezakonnykh sdelok s materinskim 
kapitalom [Alyona Batalova, Not a Children Share. More Frequent Cases of Frauds with Maternal Capital 
in Urals]], Rossiiskaya gazeta (sep. 29, 2014), <http://www.rg.ru/2011/09/29/reg-ural/kapital.html> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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a second or a subsequent child in order to do so. however, securing a mortgage 
from a bank is often difficult for young or lower-income families.82 Although there 
are some special mortgage programs aimed at young families (both parents must 
be under thirty years of age), the problem is that the increase in real estate prices 
outpaces new home construction, ‘putting new or bigger apartments out of reach 
for the majority of young families.’83 due to the fact that banks frequently have 
too many restrictions in place in terms of granting mortgages, it is not surprising 
that many families have turned to micro-credit organizations to obtain loans.84 
while many of these loans are perfectly legitimate, multiple cases of fraud have 
been detected involving micro-credit agencies.85 In 2013 the government passed 
legislation designed to clamp down on fraudulent transactions perpetrated by these 
agencies. the law states that only prescribed organizations can now grant real estate 
loans and work with maternal capital funds (prior to this legislation, any micro-
credit organization could make a request to the Pension Fund to transfer maternal 
capital funds to it to cover a loan for the purchase of real estate).86 while the purpose 
of this legislation is to reduce fraud, it will undoubtedly have an impact on young 
and lower-income families; they will no longer be able to secure credit to purchase 
real estate, since most of the loan granting agencies will now have criteria similar 
to those of the banks.
Another option that is popular with young families is to purchase property from 
their relatives. In many cases such transactions constitute the only way for such 
families to improve their living conditions. however, these types of transactions 
are also associated with high levels of fraud and are scrutinized more severely by 
82  Лукин Д. Кто и зачем конвертирует материнский капитал в уголовные дела? [Lukin d. Kto i zachem 
konvertiruet materinskii kapital v ugolovnye dela? [dmitry Lukin, Who and Why Converts Maternal Capital 
in Criminal Procedings?]], FLB (Jun. 6, 2012), <http://flb.ru/info/51227.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
83  Nabi Abdullaev, Boosting Population a Vague Science, the Moscow times (Jul. 11, 2008), <http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/news/article/368867.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015). on March 16, 2014, the 
russian government launched a program aimed at construction of affordable housing, where the 
price of such housing would not exceed 30,000 rubles for one square meter. See Maternal Capital 
Portal, supra n. 31.
84  Lukin, supra n. 82.
85  rubnikovich et al., supra n. 69.
86  See Федеральный закон от 7 июня 2013 г. № 128-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в статьи 8 и 10 
Федерального закона «О дополнительных мерах государственной поддержки семей, 
имеющих детей»» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 7 iyunya 2013 g. No. 128-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v stat’i 8 i 10 
Federal’nogo zakona “O dopolnitel’nykh merakh gosudarstvennoi podderzhki semei, immeyushchikh 
detei”’ [Federal Law No. 128-FZ of June 7, 2013, ‘on Amendments to Articles 8 and 10 of the Federal 
Law “on Additional government support Measures of Families with Children”’]]; see also: Zaem pod 
materinskii kapital – sredstva obnalishit ne poluchitsya!, supra n. 74; Круглый стол: «Материнский 
капитал: практика и проблематика» (28 сентября 2012 года) (стенограмма) [Kruglyi stol: ‘Materinskii 
kapital: praktika i problematika’ (stenogramma) [Round Table: ‘Maternal Capital: Practice and Problems’ 
(Sep. 28, 2012) (stenograph)]], <http://www.chelduma.ru/news/v-chelyabinske-obsudili-problemy-
materinskogo-kapitala> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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the Pension Fund and the courts.87 Many young families with children are unable to 
secure a loan or provide a down payment, so they try to monetize maternal capital 
funds to pay off their relatives who helped them out, or they try to use these funds for 
their daily needs and continue to share their living quarters with their relatives.88
A further problem that drives families with children to monetize maternal capital 
funds, instead of actually purchasing property, is the requirement prescribed in the 
legislation that all family members (i.e. husband, wife, and all the children) must 
register as property owners if maternal capital funds are being used to purchase 
property. All family members are to be registered as property owners in ‘agreed upon 
shares.’89 this requirement has proven to be quite problematic for families that in 
the future may want to sell the property that they acquired utilizing maternal capital 
funds; it has also been problematic for the banks and other credit organizations 
that grant mortgages and do not include underage children as property owners on 
any of the documents. the Pension Fund requires an undertaking to be signed by 
registered property owners, which states that upon the discharge of their mortgage 
obligations, they will register all family members as property owners in agreed upon 
shares within six months.90 the Procuracy of the russian Federation is supposed 
to track down those who do not comply with such an undertaking.91 while the 
theoretical rational behind these provisions is clear, in practice these requirements 
are highly problematic. Many mortgages are 15 or 20 years in duration, so once the 
mortgage is paid out in full, the children are no longer underage and may simply 
not be aware of their rights under the maternal capital legislation (this program 
may not even exist at that point in the future). Furthermore, it would be hard for the 
Procuracy to check on all of the real estate transactions that have involved maternal 
capital, and checking these transactions would be selective at best.92 Moreover, the 
violation of the obligation to register underage children may lead to unwinding of 
future sales involving innocent third-party buyers. the court practice has so far been 
87  See decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation of November 23, 2012.Case No. 88- 
kg12-2.
88  Материнский капитал. Судебная практика [Materinskii capital. Sudebnaya praktika [Maternal Capital. 
Jurisprudence]], ZAO Stroibeton (Aug. 23, 2012), <http://stroybeton.spb.ru/articles/2157-materinskij-
kapital-sudebnaya-praktika> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
89  See Art. 10(4) of the Federal Law No. 256-FZ.
90  See sec. 13(zh) of the decree of the government of the russian Federation No. 832 of december 12, 
2007.
91  See Приказ Генеральной прокуратуры Российской Федерации от 27 ноября 2007 г. № 188 
«Об организации прокурорского надзора за исполнением законов о несовершеннолетних 
и молодежи» [Prikaz General’noi prokuratury Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 27 noyabrya 2007 g. No. 188 ‘Ob 
organizatsii prokuroskogo nadzora za ispolneniem zakonov o nesovershennoletnikh i molodezhi’ [order 
of the general Public Prosecutor’s office No. 188 of November 27, 2007, ‘on Procuracy supervision 
of obligations Arising in respect of Laws Concerning underage Children]].
92  Round Table: ‘Maternal Capital: Practice and Problems’ (Sep. 28, 2012) (stenograph), supra n. 86.
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inconsistent in regard to the validity of such future sales, where the property rights 
of children were not registered.93 In any case, a family may have trouble reselling 
property acquired with maternal capital funds, as future buyers may be wary of 
entering into such transactions.
ultimately, what underlies using maternal capital for most real estate fraud 
cases as well as the low usage of such capital for education and pension purposes 
is people’s lack of trust in sustainable state institutions. Mothers and their families 
want the money here and now because they do not believe that the money will be 
available in the future (in part, such belief is justified by the turbulent history of the 
1990s and several bank collapses).94 the other side of the coin is that the state does 
not trust its citizens to use maternal capital money in a responsible fashion and has 
thus prescribed very limited usages for these funds.95 this lack of trust on both sides 
creates fertile ground in which fraud and corruption flourish.
6. Impact of Maternal Capital on Birth Rates
In addition to figuring out why fraud is so prevalent when it comes to maternal 
capital, another very important issue that needs to be considered is whether maternal 
capital is going to make a difference when it comes to increasing russia’s birthrate – 
the purpose for which it was introduced in the first place.
what needs to be acknowledged is that maternal capital is not changing the 
underlying root causes that drive russian families to settle for only one child. Most 
russian cities simply lack the infrastructure to support families with children. there is 
an absence of safe modern playgrounds for children, and public transportation and 
city streets have not been adapted to accommodate mothers with strollers.96 there is 
a lack of affordable housing for young families. It is very difficult to find apartments 
that have more than two bedrooms within a reasonable price range.97
93  See Комаров И. Правда о материнском капитале. Всегда ли законны сделки с использованием 
материнского капитала? (коментарий к статье «Махинации с материнским капиталом» Оксаны 
Мун) // Жилищное право. 2013. № 12 [komarov I. Pravda o materinskom kapitale. Vsegda li zakonny 
sdelki s ispol’zovaniem materinskogo kapitala? (kommentarii k stat’e ‘Makhinatsii s materinskim kapitalom’ 
Oksany Mun) // Zhilishchnoe pravo. 2013. No. 6 [Iliya komarov, The Truth about the Maternal Capital. 
Are the Transactions with Maternal Capital Always Legal? (comments to the Oksana Mun’s article ‘Frauds 
with Maternal Capital’), 2013(6) housing Law]], available at <http://mat-kap.ru/komarov> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2015).
94  Borozdina et al., supra n. 55, at 114.
95  Round Table: ‘Maternal Capital: Practice and Problems’ (Sep. 28, 2012) (stenograph), supra n. 86.
96  Infrastructure for Children, the Moscow times (sep. 5, 2007), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
sitemap/free/2007/9/article/infrastructure-for-children/194590.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
97  Шеин О. Финансовая помощь семьям не решает демографической проблемы [shein o. Finansovaya 
pomoshch’ semyam ne reshaet demograficheskoi problemy [oleg shein, The Financial Support to Families 
Does Not Solve the Demographic Problem]], Demograficheskaya politika (Jun. 14, 2006), <http://
demografia.viperson.ru/main.php?Ih=9088&Id=418924&Pg=4> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
ALExANDRA ORLOVA 101
Finding daycare spaces is another major issue. In many larger cities parents have 
to get in line for a place in publicly subsidized daycare before their children are born 
and, even then, there is no guarantee of a space. there are ‘currently about 1 million 
families on [daycare] waiting lists.’98 Furthermore, maternal capital does not solve the 
issue of discrimination faced by pregnant women or women with young children in 
the workplace.99 Although the russian Labor Code and the Constitution guarantee 
equality between men and women, such equality is only theoretical in nature.100 
For instance, it is ‘common practice for employers in russia to put gender and age 
requirements in their want ads.’101 the gender wage gap in russia is still between 
35 and 40%.102 overall, maternal capital cannot compensate women for time out of 
the workforce and does nothing to combat stereotypes about women with children 
that are already prevalent within russian working culture.103 often, russian women 
with higher levels of education and good possibilities of career advancement forego 
having children altogether. In the words of one russian celebrity, ‘capitalism acts as 
the best form of contraception.’104
Moreover, the whole idea of a family with multiple children is not a popular 
one in russia, so providing material incentives to families in the form of maternal 
capital is unlikely to result in a radical change in attitudes. the government has 
recently attempted to increase the popularity of larger families through innovative 
campaigns, including posting large billboards in major cities that lionize russian 
cultural icons who were third children in their families, such as yuri gagarin and 
Anton Chekhov.105 however, despite these promotional efforts, the number of 
families in russia with more than one child keeps declining.106 Larger families are not 
98  Infrastructure for Children, supra n. 96.
99  Borozdina et al., supra n. 55, at 115.
100  rivkin-Fish, supra n. 6, at 716.
101  Lena smirnova, Demographics and Careers Collide for Women Workers, the Moscow times (oct. 29, 
2012), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/demographics-and-careers-collide-for-
women-workers/470534.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
102  Новикова Е. Российские женщины жалеют, что родились женщинами [Novikova E. Rossiiskie 
zhenshchiny zhaleyut, chto rodilis’ zhenshchinami [Elena Novikova, Russian Women Regret Being Born 
Female]], Rossiiskaya gazeta (Mar. 9, 2011).
103  rivkin-Fish, supra n. 6, at 716; see also svetlana osadchuk, Odds Stacked against Breast-Feeding Moms, 
the Moscow times (Apr. 24, 2008), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/odds-stacked-
against-breast-feeding-moms/362274.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
104  Акпаров В. Демографическая ситуация в России в 2010 году по данным переписи населения 
[Akparov V. Demograficheskaya situatsiya v Rossii v 2010 godu po dannym perepisi naseleniya [Valery 
Akparov, The Demographic Situation in Russia in 2010 According to Census]], Milliardnaya Rossiya: Proekt 
pensionnoi reformy (dec. 17, 2011), <http://akparov.ru/node/267> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
105  Они родились третьими [Oni rodilis’ tret’imi [They Were Born Third]], Miloserdie.ru (May 18, 2011), 
<http://old.miloserdie.ru/articles/oni-rodilis-tretimi> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
106  this concern about one-child families is not new for russia. In both the 1970s and 1980s, the 
government attempted to portray small families as ‘deviant and dangerous phenomenon.’ however, 
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popular for a number of reasons. some of them are quite obvious, such as generally 
low incomes, lack of stable employment, and unsatisfactory living conditions. Many 
russians also associate large families with migrants from the North Caucasus and 
Central Asia – both regions that experience high birthrates. russians view these 
migrants very unfavorably and associate them with increased insecurity and threats 
to russian cultural values.107 It is not surprising, then, that when the program of 
maternal capital payments commenced, the largest share of these subsidies was 
going to mostly non-slavic areas of the russian south, which have traditionally had 
higher birth rates, such as Chechnya and dagestan. however, after a few years, the 
birth rates started to increase in the russian north as well, especially in siberia. what 
is notable is that birthrates remained the same in such large metropolitan cities as 
Moscow. In part, this can be explained by significantly higher prices in these major 
urban areas, especially real estate prices. thus, the purchasing power of maternal 
capital is much lower in major cities.108
given all the barriers to larger families that exist in russia, families that decide 
to have more than one child are, for the most part, not influenced by maternal 
capital, but rather view it only as a ‘bonus.’109 Maternal capital does not play a role 
in increasing the number of children that a particular family may have; what it may 
do, however, is shrink the number of years between the births of those children.110 
hence, the increase in birth rate since the introduction of maternal capital in 2007111 
can be explained by births being more concentrated in a certain time period as well 
as the baby boomers of the 1980s reaching their peak reproductive years.112
one-time cash payments, such as maternal capital, are much easier to provide 
than adequate housing, daycare programs, subsidized after-school programs, and 
during the transition years of the 1990s and early 2000s, these discussions ceased. See rivkin-Fish, 
supra n. 6, at 708, 710.
107  Akparov, supra n. 104.
108  Тимаков В. Эксперт: Mатеринский капитал оказался эффективным [timakov V. Ekspert: Materinskii 
kapital okazalsya effektivnym [Vladimir timakov, Expert: Maternal Capital Proved to Be Effective]], 
Rossiiskaya gazeta (oct. 15, 2014), <http://www.rg.ru/2014/10/15/reg-cfo/timakov.html> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2014).
109  Borozdina et al., supra n. 55.
110  Быстров А.А. Материнский капитал: стимулирование рождаемости? // Социологические 
исследования. 2008. № 12. C. 91 [Bystrov A.A. Materinskii kapital: stimulirovanie rozhdaemosti? // 
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya. 2008. No. 12. s. 91 [Andrey A. Bystrov, Maternal Capital: Stimulating 
the Birth Rate?, 2008(12) sociological research 91]], available at <http://ecsocman.hse.ru/socis/
msg/19145354.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
111  In the interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station in 2013, the Minister of Labor and social Protection 
Maxim topilin stated that the birth rate has risen 30% since the introduction of maternal capital. See 
Russia’s Birth Rate up 30% since 2007, the Moscow times (Jun. 20, 2013), <http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/news/article/russias-birth-rate-up-30-since-2007/481993.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
112  Natalya krainova, Experts Dismiss Population Rise as Momentary Blip, the Moscow times (dec. 12, 
2012), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/472977.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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extended maternity leaves. ultimately, such payments are ‘not that efficient from 
the point of view of long-term influence on fertility.’113 the russian government 
needs to address issues beyond fertility, if it wants to mitigate the current negative 
demographic situation. to do so, the two most immediate issues that the government 
needs to consider are high death rates and migration.
while russia’s low birthrate is not unique, especially when it comes to Europe, its 
death rate, particularly among males, is exceptional. while western life expectancy 
has increased by 10 years to 78 years (for males) since the mid-1960s, russian life 
expectancy has yet to regain the life-expectancy levels of 64.89 years (for males) of 
1964.114 the primary causes of death, which include excessive alcohol consumption 
and cardiovascular disease, are highly preventable through both the promotion 
of healthy lifestyles and proper investment in public healthcare.115 russian public 
healthcare has been deteriorating ever since the collapse of the soviet union, 
and the ‘national programs and reforms in public health are chaotic, inconsistent, 
and often have the character of public relations events.’116 thus, access to quality 
healthcare remains very uneven.117
while the birth and death rates have remained relatively unchanged, russia has 
also been unable to replenish its population through migration. Although russia has 
an immense territory, its population is only 142.9 million. thus, the country’s greatest 
poverty ‘is the sparseness of its population over an immense territory,’ especially 
when it comes to the resource-rich and strategically important Far East.118 while many 
ethnic russians returned to russia from the ‘sister republics’ following the collapse 
of the soviet union in 1991, this stream of migration is now over. Most migrants that 
113  the experience of European countries with maternal allowances from the 1970s to 1990s showed that 
the birth rates increased only for five to six years before leveling out again. see krainova, supra n. 113; 
see also Jessica Bechman, State Demography Policy Won’t Work, UN Warns, the Moscow times (Apr. 27, 
2009), <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/tmt/376593.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
114  See Philippe descamps, Russia’s Demographic Crisis, Le Monde diplomatigue, Jul. 15–17, 2011, 
available at <http://joun.leb.net/descamps07152011.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015); see also david 
A. Leon, Trends in European Life Expectancy: A Salutary View, 2011 Int’l J. Epidemiol. 1, 2 (2011), available 
at <http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/ije/press_releases/freepdf/dyr061.pdf> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2015). doi:10.1093/ije/dyr061
115  For example, cardiovascular diseases account for 55% of all deaths, four times the rate of western 
Europe. See Abdullaev, supra n. 83.
116  Maria Avdeeva et al., Russia’s Demographic Crisis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jan. 26, 
2012), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/26/russia-s-demographic-crisis/9aml> (accessed 
Jul. 27, 2015).
117  Abdullaev, supra n. 83.
118  the russian Far East is larger than the European union, but only has 6.4 million people. Its population 
density is not even a hundredth of what it is in its neighbor China. See descamps, supra n. 115; see 
also Fred weir, Putin Vows to Halt Russia’s Population Plunge with Babies, Immigrants, the Christian 
science Monitor (Feb. 14, 2012), <http://www.csmonitor.com/world/2012/0214/Putin-vows-to-halt-
russia-s-population-plunge-with-babies-immigrants> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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still want to come to russia tend to be economic migrants from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. the ethnic russian population, however, consistently demonstrates 
‘extremely low tolerance for migrants,’ especially those who are non-slavic. Moreover, 
migration to russia is further complicated by the bureaucratic measures that are 
supposedly in place to combat illegal migration.119
7. The Future of Maternal Capital
the immediate future of the maternal capital program was placed into question 
in october 2014, when the Ministry of Economic development suggested that the 
program be suspended in 2015 (prior to its official end date of 2016). According to 
the Ministry, the cancellation of the program would result in a savings of 300 billion 
rubles (approximately us$8.3 billion).120 the Ministry was tasked with optimizing 
budget expenses due to the difficult political and economic situation that russia 
currently finds itself in.
After the russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March of 2014, which 
is not recognized by the us and the Eu, successive rounds of economic sanctions 
were imposed on russia. russia is also being blamed for tacitly supporting rebel 
forces in the current ukrainian conflict, an accusation that russia denies. In addition 
to western sanctions, the russian economy has been seriously affected by the falling 
oil prices – a commodity that provides the greatest contribution to the russian 
budget.121 the combined effect of sanctions and falling oil prices has slowed down 
economic growth to 0.5%, while inflation has soared to 8%.122 Moreover, foreign banks, 
which are still trying to restore their tarnished reputations after the 2008 financial 
crisis, have tightened credit for all russian companies, even those not included on 
any economic sanctions lists. retail prices are rising due to russia’s retaliatory ban 
on European foodstuffs, thus consumers have started to rein in spending and the 
business elite is feeling uncertain about future projects involving foreign investors.123 
Moreover, the federal government has promised a creation of a multibillion-dollar 
119  Avdeeva et al., supra n. 116.
120  Минэкономразвития предложило отменить материнский капитал [Minekonomrazvitiya predlozhilo 
otmenit’ materinskii kapital [Ministry of Economic Development Suggested to Abolish Maternal Capital]], 
Lenta.ru (oct. 1, 2014), <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/10/01/matkap/> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
121  According to official estimates, the oil and gas revenues constitute approximately 60% of the federal 
budget. the actual contributions may be even higher. See Ivan grachev & sergei guriev, Russia’s Oil: 
Luck or Curse?, russia & India report (oct. 26, 2012), <http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/10/26/russias_
oil_luck_or_curse_18655.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
122  kenneth rapoza, For Putin, Oil Decline Worse Than Obama’s Sanctions, Forbes (oct. 9, 2014), <http://
www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/10/09/declining-oil-hurting-putins-economy-more-than-
u-s-sanctions/> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
123  Jennifer rankin, Russian Sanctions Start to Bite as Growth Forecasts are Downgraded, the guardian 
(Aug. 17, 2014), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/17/russia-lending-sanctions-impact-
on-economy> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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bailout fund for companies hurt by western sanctions imposed over the ukraine 
crisis. this measure is quite indicative of the country’s belief that it is entering into 
a ‘long period of economic isolation.’124
given all these pressures, it is not surprising that the Ministry of Economic 
development has been tasked with finding programs that can be cut, in order to 
minimize funds that need to be taken out of russia’s reserve fund. the maternal 
capital program has been an expensive one to run. Furthermore, the government has 
made a promise that, commencing in 2015, families living in the Crimean peninsula 
can take advantage of the maternal capital program, if they gave birth to or adopted 
a second or subsequent child as of January 1, 2007. this ‘territorial extension’ of 
maternal capital would cost the russian federal budget an additional 3.4 billion 
rubles (us$83.3 million) a year.125 the Ministry of Economic development expressed 
a view that maternal capital does not, in fact, increase the number of children, but 
rather readjusts the timing of births for families that have already made a decision 
to have more than one child.126
the news of a possible suspension of the maternal capital subsidy was met with 
significant public outcry. the Ministry of Economic development was shamed for 
‘trying to economize on mothers,’ especially since the children of the 1990s (already 
a smaller population) were entering their reproductive years and would be left once 
again without state support.127 Various politicians and public advocates noted that 
the problem of demographic growth was more important than the impact from 
any sanctions, as population growth has to do with the very survival of a nation.128 
After the public anger began to build, the government quickly issued reassurances 
that the maternal capital program would not be suspended in 2015 but would be 
allowed to operate in the same format as originally planned until the end of 2016. 
russian Vice Premier olga golodets reassured the public that the federal budget 
has the funds to sustain this program until 2017.129
124  Alexander kolyandr & Andrey ostroukh, Russia Plans Emergency Fund for Companies Hurt by Ukraine 
Sanctions, wall street Journal (sep. 15, 2014), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-plans-emergency-
fund-for-companies-hurt-by-ukraine-sanctions-1410802572> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
125  На материнский капитал в Крыму нужно 3 млрд рублей ежегодно [Na materinskii kapital v Krymu 
nuzhno 3 mlrd. rublei ezhegodno [Three Billion Rubles Are Necessary Annually for Maternal Capital in 
Crimea]], <http://region-matkapital.ru/novosti/matkapital-krym-3-mlrd/> (accessed Jul. 27, 2014).
126  Ministry of Economic Development Suggested to Abolish Maternal Capital, supra n. 120.
127  Материнский капитал отменят в 2017 году, но на замену хотят ввести новую программу [Mate-
rinskii kapital otmenyat v 2017 godu, no na zamenu khotyat vvesti novuyu programmu [Maternal Capital 
Will Be Cancelled in 2017, but It Is Intended to Be Replaced by a New Program]], <http://finansiko.ru/
materinskij_kapital_otmenyat_v_2017_godu/> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
128  Грицюк М. Материнский капитал никто не тронет [gritsyuk M. Materinskii kapital nikto ne tronet 
[Marina gritsyuk, Maternal Capital Will Stay Intact]], Rossiiskaya gazeta (oct. 9, 2014), <http://www.
rg.ru/2014/10/09/kapital.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
129  Зыкова Т. Капитал никто не отменял [Zykova t. Kapital nikto ne otmenyal [tatyana Zykova, Nobody 
Annulled the Capital]], Rossiiskaya gazeta (oct. 2, 2014), <http://www.rg.ru/2014/10/02/materinsky-
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It is quite understandable why there was a public outcry in response to the news 
of a possible program cancellation. It has taken a while, but people understand 
how the maternal capital program works, despite all of its imperfections and design 
flaws. New proposed measures of tying the maternal capital subsidy to income are 
uncertain and, in a country like russia, any new bureaucratic development takes 
a while to start working.130 the government, in turn, given the current economic 
and political situation in russia and the country’s difficult relationship with the 
west, does not want to risk a massive wave of protests, similar to the ones that 
occurred in 2005. In 2005 protests and demonstrations over the government’s 
cancellation and subsequent monetization of many social security benefits took 
place in dozens of russian cities. the protesters called for the resignation of both 
the government and President Putin.131 despite currently high approval rates by 
russians of Putin’s policies (up to 82%), the regime understands that these ratings 
have nowhere to go but down and thus does not want to risk undermining its 
reputation domestically, while it faces western disapproval over its position in the 
ukrainian conflict.132 thus, it seems that for now the maternal capital program is 
secure until the end of 2016, at which point vigorous debates are likely to occur 
over its renewal and its costs.
8. Conclusion
It is apparent that concerns over plunging birthrates are not new in russia. Prior 
to the collapse of the soviet union, women’s roles as mothers were tied in public 
discourse to their duty to the state. the state, in return, attempted to provide various 
social and economic guarantees to mothers to encourage births. After the collapse 
of the soviet union, women’s reproductive functions were displaced into the private 
sphere until the early 2000s, when the rise of the state became the priority of the 
Putin administration. the maternal capital program fit well into the administration’s 
statist agenda, especially as the economy started to improve and russia was awash 
in ‘petro-dollars’ that could be spent to pursue this particular political course.
capital.html> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015). since many aspects of the maternal capital program require 
waiting to make a claim until the child is three years old, it would mean that the federal budget would 
have to have funds to support this program at least until the end of 2019, and possibly beyond.
130  Маткапитал: забрать у богатых и отдать бедным [Matkapital: zabrat’ u bogatykh i otdat’ bednym 
[Maternal Capital: Take from Rich and Give It to Poor]], Pravda.ru (sep. 6, 2013), <http://www.pravda.
ru/society/family/06-09-2013/1173329-capital-0/> (accessed october 15, 2014).
131  Neil Buckley & Arkady ostrovsky, Huge Protests in Russia over Benefits, Financial times (Jan. 17, 2005), 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93dba120-682c-11d9-a11e-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3h7tp1qrc> 
(accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
132  Пресса России: рейтинг Путина растет на санкциях [Pressa Rossii: Reiting Putina rastet na sanktsiyakh 
[Press in Russia: Putin’s Rating Grows on Sanctions]], BBC (Aug. 14, 2014), <http://www.bbc.com/russian/
russia/2014/08/140814_rus_press> (accessed Jul. 27, 2015).
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In terms of the actual effectiveness of the maternal capital program, a careful 
assessment reveals that despite the claims that maternal capital will ‘raise [women’s] 
social status and help . . . resolve future problems,’133 this measure is not going to create 
a desired baby boom.134 the amount of maternal capital, although not insignificant, 
is really a fraction of the cost of what it would take to secure adequate housing 
or to take care of a child’s daily needs (especially in the case of sick or disabled 
children) over the years. It does not solve the issue of work / family balance, gender 
inequality, lack of child appropriate infrastructure, or one-child family attitudes 
that currently dominate russian society. Furthermore, expenses associated with 
running this program (some of which were not anticipated when the program 
commenced)135 are causing the government to think seriously about continuing the 
program in the same format beyond 2016, especially given the potential economic 
recession. Currently, the limited use of maternal capital prescribed by the state 
displays a fundamental lack of trust towards its citizens, which in turn breeds fraud 
and corruption. russian families that are entitled to receive maternal capital view 
it as a bonus that should be used ‘here and now,’ as it may not be available in the 
future.136 this demonstrates a lack of trust on the part of the people towards the long-
term sustainability of state institutions. the current proposals for reform are likely to 
just exacerbate the situation.137 thus, since money cannot buy trust, the outcome is 
a failed program, despite its noble intentions.
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